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economies, though only to a limited extent (Gross and Kaufmann 2002).
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The referendum experience in other European countries is described in Gallagher and Uleri (1996).
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Time
The referendum process may be shaped by requiring a sufficient amount of time to pass
between the start of an initiative or referendum process, the actual vote and the resulting
decision becoming effective. This is a move towards the constitutional idea (e.g. Mueller
1996) of putting people behind the veil of uncertainty, and therefore inducing them to take a
more  objective position.
A more innovative idea is to proceed, as (many) parliaments do, namely to have a first,
second and sometimes even a third reading of a law. In a direct democracy, one could first
have an informative vote, and after sufficient time has elapsed to allow for a discussion of the
outcome, a decisive vote could be cast.
Co-determination
The citizens decision may only become effective if it is supported by a corresponding vote in
the parliament (and perhaps even in the two houses). This would, however, reduce
referendums to a plebiscite. Another possibility would be to accord a veto right either to the
citizens or to the parliament. One may also consider a double majority in the form of the
popular vote and votes in the regions (cantons or states). This latter requirement applies, for
instance, in Switzerland, where both the majority of all the Swiss voters, and the majority of
the cantons, must approve a constitutional referendum.
7 Concluding Remarks
The crucial question is who governs the step by step introduction of directly democratic
instruments. Ideally, it would be a constitutional assembly. Its members are not directly
involved in current politics, so they take a more objective stance. They do not have to fear a
reduction in their own power if direct democracy is introduced in the future. In reality,
however, a considerable number of the members are likely to belong to the  classe politique .
They either served in political decision making in the past, currently do so, or hope to do so
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in the future. In all cases, they tend to oppose popular participation in political decision-
making.
For these reasons the active involvement of the citizens in amending the constitution, as well
as in more general political decision making, cannot be substituted by resorting to
representation. Giving citizens rights to directly participate in political decision making can
be based on two different types of reasoning. The first takes such political rights as a value as
such, which must not be legitimized any further. Direct democracy is then taken as the next
logical major step from the introduction of democracy in the classical Athenian city-state and
its broadening over whole nations in the wake of the French revolution.
The second type of reasoning considers the favorable consequences of giving the citizens the
right to directly participate in political decision making. This paper identifies two sources of
benefits:
(a) Procedural Utility. Direct participation rights raises citizens utility, quite independent
of the outcomes reached. Empirical evidence suggests that citizens subjective
reported well-being (ceteris paribus) is the higher, the more extensive their
participation rights are.
(b) Outcome Utility. When the citizens are allowed to directly participate in political
decisions, the policies undertaken yield more favorable results for them. Extensive
empirical evidence for Switzerland and the United States (the leaders in direct
democracy) suggests that more extensive participation rights via popular initiatives
and referenda lead to a lower tax burden and lower public expenditures; to higher
efficiency and productivity in the provision of public goods and services; and to
higher overall satisfaction (happiness) of the population.
The following arguments are often raised against direct democratic institutions: the citizens
fail to understand the complex issues; they have little interest in participating; they are easy to
manipulate; they tend to decide emotionally; the large number of referenda lead to confusion;
leadership is made impossible; direct democracy is inadequate for major issues, hinders
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progress, destroys civil rights and is very expensive. This paper argues that these arguments
should be rejected, in particular if a comparative stance is taken, i.e. if decision making in
direct democracy is contrasted with that in representative democracy.
Elements of direct democracy can be introduced gradually and there are many possibilities [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]