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who was none too pleased with the attitude of all his colleagues, who supported
Sir Horace Rumbold and Count Oberndorff. Only the French Minister, M. de
Panafieu, thought the situation most critical, did not conceal his fear that the
departure of the Diplomatic Corps for Posen would give the impression of flight
and arouse public indignation. Together with Monsignor Ratti and the Italian
Minister he believed that Warsaw was not to be abandoned until the last moment
and that the advice of Sir Horace Rumbold and Count Oberndorf to leave the
capital at once, should not be followed, unless the internal situation collapsed
and the military defense of the town was thereby jeopardized.
M. de Panafieu s view was in reality closer to that of the British and
German Ministers than to that of the Papal Nuncio and the Italian Minister. The
latter, of course, wanted to stay in Warsaw even if the Bolsheviks came into the
city, but they were frankly hopeful about the military and internal situation.
They saw no danger for the Diplomatic Corps in delaying its departure for Posen
to the very last minute.
But for M. de Panafieu it was only the military situation that seemed
hopeful. He could not very well mistrust Weygand. Since a French general had
now been entrusted with the defense of the town, the French Minister pretended
to agree with Sir Horace Rumbold and Count Oberndorff not because he was
doubtful about the military situation, but solely because of the dangers inherent
in the internal situation. The French and German Ministers were especially afraid
lest Warsaw should fall into the hands of the Bolshevik army. Only a Jewish or
Communist revolt could officially concern M. de Panafieu.  What I fear, said
the French Minister,  is that Pilsudski and Weygand may be stabbed in the
back.
According to Monsignor Pellegrinetti, Secretary at the Nunciate, the Papal
Nuncio did not believe in a coup d Etat.  The Nuncio, said General Carton de
Wiart, head of the British Military Mission,  cannot envisage this miserable mob
from the ghetto and the suburbs of Warsaw daring to try to seize hold of power.
But Poland is not like the Church in which only Popes and Cardinals make coups
d Etat.
Monsignor Ratti was convinced of the failure of rebellion, although he
was not impressed by the precautions against new and more serious dangers
taken by the Government, the military leaders, and the governing classes: that is
to say, by those who were responsible for events. But M. de Panafieu s
arguments were of a nature too serious not to rouse some doubts in the mind of
the Nuncio. Hence, Monsignor Pellegrinetti s visit to the Minister Tommasini one
morning did not come as a surprise to me. The prelate came to assure him that
the Government had taken every precautionary measure to cope with any future
attempt at rebellion. The Italian Minister immediately sent for me, and in
Monsignor Pelegrinetti s presence, explained the Nuncio s doubts and told me to
find out what precautions the Government had taken to prevent disorders and to
suppress a revolt. General Romei, the head of the Italian Military Mission, had
just brought news confirming the continual advance of the Bolshevik offensive,
which left him not the slightest doubt about the fate of Warsaw. It was August
12th. That night Trotsky s army was within some twenty miles of the town.  If
the Polish troops can hold out for another day or two, said the Minister,
 General Weygand s move may yet be successful. But we must not expect too
much. He told me to go down to the working class districts and to the Nalevski
quarter where I they feared disorders ; to discover on the spot the most critical
centers in the city, and to find out whether Weygand and Pilsudski had been
adequately protected and the Government sufficiently guaranteed against a
possible coup de main.   It would be better, he ended,  if you did not go alone.
And he advised me to go with Captain Rollin, an attaché at the French Legation.
Captain Rollin, a Cavalry Officer, was in the  second bureau of the staff.
He was one of the most able and gifted collaborators of M. de Panafien and of
General Henrys, the head of the French Military Mission. He frequently called at
the Italian Legation and was on excellent terms with the Italian Minister, indeed
they were cordial friends. I met him again in Rome during the Fascist Revolution
in 1921 and 1922, when he was attached to the French Embassy in the Farnese
Palace. Mussolini s revolutionary tactics had completely won his admiration.
After the Bolshevik army had laid siege to Warsaw, I used to go with him
every day to the Polish outposts in order to follow more closely the vicissitudes
of the battle. But the Bolshevik soldiers did not look very formidable except for
those red Cossacks who were terrible cavalrymen and worthy of a nobler cause.
The others went into battle slowly and pitifully. They looked like a famished and
ragged crowd that is moved by fear and hunger alone. With all my experience of
war on the French and Italian fronts I could not understand how the Poles could
retreat in front of such soldiers.
Captain Rollin seemed to think that the Polish Government had no notion
of the art of defending a modern State. The same criticism might be applied to
Pilsudski in another sense. Polish soldiers are said to be fearless. But what is the
use of fearless soldiers if their leaders do not know that the art of defense lies in a
knowledge of their own weak spots? The precautionary measures which the
Government took in order, to meet any attempt at rebellion proved that it was
unaware of the weakest spots in a modern State.
The technique of the coup d Etat has advanced considerably since the days [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]